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City Planning Commission Members City of Pleasanton, CA. April 16, 2018 Page 5 It is clear that a denial of the CUP will result in a substantial burden on the Chabad's religious exercise. While RLUIPA does not define the term "substantial burden," case law is instructive. In the Ninth Circuit, "for a land use regulation to impose a substantial burden, it must be oppressive to a significantly great extent. That is, a substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise." San Jose Chr. College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Under this interpretation, "[a] substantial burden exists where the governmental authority puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."Intl Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a substantial burden "must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise." Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988 (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004)). Here, the Chabad has made clear that an essential tenet of its religious mission is to worship outdoors. Should the Planning Commission deny the CUP,the Chabad will be barred from using a large segment of its property for essential religious assembly purposes. This action will impose "a significantly great restriction or onus upon" the Chabad's religious exercise. San Jose Chr. College, 360 F.3d at 1034. By barring the Chabad from worshiping outside, the actions are undoubtedly "more than an inconvenience" on its religious exercise. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988. It would be a"substantial burden" on the Free Exercise of Religion. Once a Court finds a municipality's actions impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, the burden shifts to the municipal defendant to prove that imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.See 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- 2(b). Compelling state interests are "interests of the highest order." Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). Such interests include protecting public health, safety or welfare. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406(1963) ("[O]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."). "Demonstrating a compelling interest and showing that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). The standard "is not watered...down but really means what it says.' Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (internal citations omitted).Thus,the government must"show a compelling interest...in the particular case at hand, not a compelling interest in general." Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007). According to the Department of Justice, a municipality cannot simply point to an interest in noise in the abstract as a compelling interest justifying a substantial burden on religious exercise. Rather,